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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
Michael Vitiello*

In a single term the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit renders a vast number of decisions in the field of civil procedure. Since comprehensive coverage of the jurisprudence in this
area would be impossible, three criteria, although not rigidly applied, were used by this author in an attempt to select noteworthy
cases. These criteria include: (1) whether the United States Supreme Court reserved the question decided by the Fifth Circuit or
whether there is a poignant conflict among the courts of appeals, so
that in either instance, Supreme Court action might be expected in
the near future; (2) whether an area of law has been addressed
repeatedly, suggesting general interest among members of the bar;
and (3) whether a particular decision by the Fifth Circuit raises
important analytical difficulties.
The cases chosen pursuant to the foregoing criteria inadvertently suggest a secondary theme. In light of Chief Justice Burger's
frequent lament that the federal caseload has reached critical proportions, it is not surprising that the cases discussed herein reflect
a trend to limit the expansion of federal court jurisdiction.'
Finally, this author has placed great emphasis on the decision
in Davis v. Passman.2 Davis .met both the first and third criteria
outlined above and clearly illustrates the enmity between the competing philosophies of the Warren and Burger Courts concerning the
appropriate jurisdictional reach of federal courts.
In Personam Jurisdiction
Two cases decided by the Fifth Circuit during the 1977-78 term
dealt with the statutory and constitutional analysis necessary to
determine the court's in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state
resident. Rule 4(d)(7) empowers a federal court to use the law of the
forum state "for the service of summons or other like process upon
any . . .defendant in an action brought in the courts of general
* Member, New Jersey and Pennsylvania Bars; Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola Uni.
versity School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. It should be noted that the trend is not universal, nor does this author pretend that
case selection was sufficiently random to be scientific.
2. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
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jurisdiction of that state."3 Initially, the district court must determine whether the nonresident's actions in the forum state come
within the state's jurisdictional statute.4 If statutory requirements
are satisfied, the court must then assess whether the nonresident's
conduct amounts to minimum contacts with the forum state such
that "maintenance of the suit [would] not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "I Despite thirty years of
case law interpreting InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington' and its
ancillary problems, application of the foregoing principles continues
to generate a considerable amount of appellate litigation.
In Black v. Acme Markets, Inc.,7 Texas cattle producers sued
several supermarket chains for conspiring to depress the price of
beef in violation of the antitrust laws. Suit was filed in the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas. Section 12 of the Clayton
Act 8 permits service of process in antitrust actions in any district
where a defendant resides or may be found. Had plaintiffs attempted service pursuant to sections c, e, and f of rule 4,9 as permitted by the Clayton Act, service by the United States Marshal or by
registered mail at corporate headquarters would have been appropriate. Instead, plaintiffs attempted service pursuant to rule 4(d)
and defendant First National Stores, a Massachusetts corporation,
was served by substitute service upon the Secretary of State of
Texas ih accordance with the provisions of the Texas long arm statute.' 0 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because service was insufficient under the Texas statute, and
because defendant lacked minimum contacts with Texas. The Fifth
Circuit reversed the lower court and remanded the case for further
proceedings because the parties had misconceived the question of
personal jurisdiction.
Rule 4(e) provides that:
Whenever a statute of the United States . . .provides for service of
a summons, . . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within

the state in which the district court is held, service may be made
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d)(7).
4. See Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977); Hilgeman v. National
Ins. Co. of America, 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977).
5. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See generally Developments in the Law: State-CourtJurisdiction,73 HARv. L. Rav. 909 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Developments in the Law].
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (e), (f).
10. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
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under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute
or order, or if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of
service, in a manner stated in this rule."
One question raised on appeal was whether service under the
Texas long arm statute was service "in a manner stated in this
rule." The court explained that section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for service of process on nonresident defendants, but because
it does not prescribe the manner for service, service could have been
made in any manner stated in rule 4. Since rule 4(d)(7) is explicit
in allowing service pursuant to the law of the state in which the
district court is held, 2 it would appear that service in Black was
made in a manner permissible under rule 4.
The court then addressed the question of whether, as a matter
of state law, defendant's conduct was within article 2031b. Section
4 of the statute provides:
For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts that
may constitute doing business, any foreign corporation . . . shall be
deemed doing business in this state by entering into contract by mail
or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in
part by either party in this state, or the committing of any tort in
whole or in part in this state. 3
The court did not rely on the substantial business activity which
defendant admittedly conducted in Texas to find that defendant
was "doing business" within the meaning of article 2031b. Instead,
the court analogized "[d]elictual conduct violative of the anti-trust
laws"" to tortious conduct for purposes of applying Texas law. Defendant's affidavit denied any direct activity within Texas in
connection with the conspiracy, 15 but armed with the analogy to tort
law, the court found that "one of the elements of a tort is damage
and plaintiffs here have alleged damage within the state of Texas.""6
Thus, as long as. the conspiracy to depress the price of beef had
foreseeable consequences in Texas, the tort was committed "in
part" in Texas for purposes of article 2031b. The court concluded:
We have no doubt that Texas courts would construe section 2031b to
reach an out-of-state corporation which had made purchases of prod11.
12.
13.

FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (emphasis added).
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).

14. 564 F.2d at 685.
15. The extensive business involved purchases of salad oil, aluminum foil, salad dressing, turkeys, and shortening, but apparently did not include direct purchases of beef, the
subject of the conspiracy. Id. at 683.
16. Id. at 685.
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ucts originating in Texas amounting to nearly $1.5 million in a single
year and is alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy whose effects
would almost certainly be felt by Texas cattle producers. 7
Once the court settled the issue that state law was satisfied, it
perfunctorily dismissed the constitutional claim of whether defendant had established minimum contacts with the forum state.'
While the case raises some interesting constitutional questions that
are not discussed," Black illustrates the first step of analysis in
establishing the in personam jurisdiction of a federal court which
relies on state law pursuant to rule 4(d)(7).
The court did address the constitutional dimension of in personam jurisdiction in Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp.,'"which also involved article 2031b of the Texas long arm statute. Although the
result in Wilkerson is generally consistent with InternationalShoe
and its progeny, the Fifth Circuit suggested a modified principle in
applying the due process test.
According to allegations in the complaint and in defendant's
motion to dismiss, the Fortuna Corporation operated Sunland Park,
a race track located in New Mexico, within a short distance of El
Paso, Texas. In 1972 and 1973, Wilkerson, a horse trainer, applied
for stalls at the track but during that time he was granted only ten
of the sixty-five requested stalls. Wilkerson sued in the District
Court for the Western District of Texas on the theory that defendant's refusal to provide the requested stalls was an arbitrary, capricious breach of its duty to him in violation of the rules of the New
Mexico Racing Commission.
Defendant moved to dismiss under rule 12(b) 2' on the ground
that it was not amenable to service under the Texas long arm statute. Its claim was based on the absence of any office, bank account,
agents, or employees in Texas, and on its incorporation and operation solely in New Mexico. The district court granted defendant's
17. Id.
18. "Moreover, . . [under Fifth Circuit precedent], there is no constitutional barrier
to the assertion of personal jurisdiction in this case." Id. at 686.
19. For example, under InternationalShoe's formulation of the due process test, the
cause of action must arise out of minimum contacts with the forum state. It would appear
that the cause of action-the beef conspiracy-did not arise out of appellant's contacts with
the state, i.e., the purchase of salad oil, etc. Alternatively, the United States Supreme Court

has not definitively resolved whether contacts may be sufficiently numerous to allow jurisdiction even if the cause of action does not arise out of those contacts. See Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 931-32.
20.
21.

554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1978).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
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motion, stating that defendant's activity was not within article
2031b, section 4, which defines "doing business," and that whatever
contacts defendant had with Texas did not amount to "minimum
contacts" required by InternationalShoe.2 In addition, on appeal,
defendant argued that even if it had the requisite contacts with
Texas, the cause of action did not arise out of those contacts.
As noted above, the starting point for analysis is whether the
defendant's activities are within the provisions of state law. Section
4 of the Texas statute 3 establishes that the minimal activity considered to be "doing business" includes: entering a contract by mail
to be performed in part in Texas 4 or committing a tort in part in
Texas. 5 The court found that defendant's activity"6 in Texas was
substantial and continuous, and therefore, clearly within the statutory concept of "doing business." In addition to the minimum contacts requirement, the Texas courts have interpreted the long arm
statute as requiring that the cause of action must arise out of those
contacts and that the assumption of jurisdiction must not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.27
Conceding that Texas law did not provide precise precedent,
the court concluded that the second state law requirement was met.
It stated:
Fortuna's broad-based doing of its race track business in Texas...
gave rise to the cause of action asserted here. Because it projected
itself into Texas daily and because its very reason for being was to
deal constantly and mostly with customers from the forum state, it
22. The district court, as cited in Wilkerson, held as follows:
None of these activities, in the court's view, rise to the level of an "act" or
"transaction" by the foreign corporation, Fortuna Corporation, that gives rise to a
cause of action for damages and none of these activities are sufficient to fulfill the
requirement of "minimum contact" with the State of Texas to warrant jurisdiction
under the Texas long arm statute.
554 F.2d at 747.
23. See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (a single life
insurance policy covering a California resident held sufficient to sustain jurisdiction over
Texas insurance company).
25. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) (explosion in Illinois of boiler manufactured out-of-state held sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction over out-of-state manufacturer).
26. Those activities included: (1) proximity of the track to El Paso, (2) telephone
listings in the white and yellow pages of the El Paso directory and absence of a charge for
phone calls from El Paso to Sunland, (3) the solicitation by means of all El Paso advertising
media, (4) expenditures for promotional activity in El Paso, (5) the solicitation of stall
applications from Texas residents, (6) the solicitation of entries for races, and (7) the acceptance of more horses from Texas than horses from any other state. 554 F.2d at 748.
27. Id. at 749-50.
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is not appropriate to require that Wilkerson demonstrate some specific local act which created the cause of action."
Finally, the court concluded that the same substantial business
contacts met the third requirement of state law: that traditional
notions of fairness and substantial justice be met.
It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the second
requirement under Texas law is questionable in that the court seemingly exempts the plaintiff from that requirement. As a matter of
federal law, substantial business activity in the forum state, without
more, may justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 9 In
Wilkerson, however, the court was interpreting Texas decisional law
which requires that the cause of action arise out of the contacts with
the state. The purpose of this requirement may be that the Texas
courts want to encourage litigants to sue in the most logical forum,
that is, the one where the cause of action arose. For example, if A
and B were involved in an altercation in a taproom located in New
Mexico, B's daily trip into Texas where he works would not justify
A's use of the Texas long arm statute to force suit in Texas. 0 Under
federal law the requisite contacts with Texas are present; however,
under article 2031b as interpreted by Texas courts, jurisdiction
would be lacking because the cause of action does not arise out of
those contacts.
Ordinarily, the issue of whether the cause of action arose out
of defendant's business contacts with the forum state arises in the
application of the constitutional test enunciated in International
Shoe. Normally courts have had little difficulty in finding the test
met in fact situations similar to Wilkerson.3 For example, if a bar
located in state C advertises in state D with the expectation that
young patrons from state D will respond to its solicitation, it cannot
avoid responding to a suit instituted in state D if the young patrons
become intoxicated and are injured while driving home.3" Similarly,
in Wilkerson, plaintiff's cause of action, defendant's refusal to provide stall space, clearly arose out of some of defendant's contacts
with the Texas market. Plaintiff obviously chose to use the Sunland
Park facility because of its location in the El Paso area. Further28. Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
29. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Developments in
the Law, supra note 5, at 931-32.
30. Obviously A need not resort to using the long arm statute if B is found personally
within the state. See, e.g., Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3 So. 321 (1888).
31. See, e.g., Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, Inc., 378 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977);
Hart v. McCollum, 376 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
32. Hart v. McCollum, 376 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
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more, it is apparent that defendant intentionally located in the El
Paso area with the expectation of drawing on Texas resources.
Under the International Shoe test, plaintiff's cause of action
must arise from certain minimum contacts, not every contact.
Thus, under such a test Wilkerson would not have to prove that he
read defendant's advertisements on placemats provided to El Paso
restaurants. As noted, however, the court did not address the problem "of the specific local act which created the cause of action,'' 33
but relied instead on the federal standard of substantiality of contacts, apparently in disregard of Texas case law.
Once satisfied that defendant's activity was within the ambit
of the long arm statute, the Fifth Circuit addressed the federal due
process question. The first requirement of InternationalShoe, like
the test set out by Texas case law, is whether there are sufficient
minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. The
answer in Wilkerson is obvious because the Fifth Circuit found substantial contacts. Furthermore, InternationalShoe, like Texas precedent, commands that the cause of action arise out of those contacts. In responding to this second requirement, the Fifth Circuit
recited its discussion of Texas law to dismiss defendant's claim that
he could not be served under the Texas long arm statute because
the cause of action did not arise out of contacts with the state. The
Fifth Circuit also found that the United States Supreme Court had
recently abrogated this prong of the InternationalShoe test in
3
National Geographic Society v. CaliforniaBoard of Equalization.
In National Geographic, the Supreme Court found the National
Geographic Society (the Society) liable for collection of a California
use tax on mail-order sales even though all of the Society's mailorder business was conducted from its headquarters located in
Washington, D.C. According to the Fifth Circuit:
The ruling was bottomed on the concept of doing business in California. The business done by the Society [in California] consisted of
the maintenance of two offices which did nothing but solicit advertising for the Society's magazine. They played no part whatsoever in
mail-order sales. The Court expressly rejected the claim that federal
constitutionaldue process requireda connection between the California activity and the matter regulatable by California statute ....
If a "minimum connection" is all that need be shown to exert the
state's power to tax, a fortiori, a non-resident may be required to
33.
(1969).
34.

See generally 4

C.

430 U.S. 551 (1977).

WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEuIa

PRAMCE & PROcURE §
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defend an action in state court even though the suit bears no relation
to the activities deemed necessary and sufficient to constitute minimum contacts.'
The statement in Wilkerson that federal due process no
longer
mandates that the cause of action arise out of the requisite contacts
has broad and serious implications. Therefore, it is necessary to
inquire whether National Geographic intimated that International
Shoe was being modified.
The Society solicited advertising copy for its monthly magazine, National Geographic Magazine, by maintaining two offices in
California. During the period in question, those offices performed no
activities related to the Society's mail-order business for sales,
rather such activities were conducted directly from the Society's
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
The California Board of Equalization (the Board) assessed the
Society with tax liability of $3,838.76. Assessment was made under
section 6203 of the California Taxation and Revenue Code which
empowers the Board to collect a use tax from "every retailer engaged in business in this state and making sales of tangible personal
property for storage, use, or other consumption in this state [unless
otherwise exempted by the Code]." 3 The Society paid the assessment under protest and sued for its refund in the state superior
court. The superior court found for the Society, but the state supreme court reversed, affirming the Board's assessment. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, the Society contended that
their offices in California provided an insufficient nexus between an
out-of-state seller and the state to support imposition of the use tax
on the Society. Furthermore, the Society argued that the Board's
attempt to tax it amounted to a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment 37 and the commerce clause. 8 The Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court.
National Geographic involved complex constitutional problems
inherent in state taxation schemes concerned with businesses engaged in interstate commerce. A statement of the tax issue in
National Geographic suggests the decision's limited precedential
value in resolving the separate question of whether the state or an
individual can establish in personam jurisdiction over the interstate
35.

36.
37.
38.

554 F.2d at 749-50 (emphasis added).
CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 6203 (West Supp. 1978).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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party in plaintiff's chosen forum.39 The Supreme Court did address
the requisite nexus between the state and the interstate business
that justified imposition of a use tax on that concern, as the citation
from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wilkerson indicates." However,
the Supreme Court did not indicate that it intended its definition
of "doing business" for purposes of taxation be used in the distinct
inquiry of whether in personam jurisdiction exists. Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit's reliance on National Geographic would appear to be
misplaced.
In addition to the Fifth Circuit's questionable reliance on
National Geographic in its attempt to resolve the due process issue
raised in Wilkerson, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its holding in InternationalShoe, giving the principles enunciated therein
new relevance. Shaffer v. Heitner,4" decided shortly after National
Geographic, considered the constitutionality of a Delaware statute
that permitted a state court to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants based solely on the statutory presence of their property
in Delaware. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because it permitted the state court to exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of
sufficient contacts among the defendants, the subject matter of the
litigation, and the forum state. The Supreme Court left little question concerning the continuing vitality of International Shoe when
it stated:
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair
play and substantial justice" as governs assertions of jurisdiction in
personam is simple and straight forward. It is premised on recognition that "[t]he phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in a thing." . . .This recognition leads to the conclusion that
in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for
jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction over
the interests of persons in a thing." The standard for determining
whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is
consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts
standard elucidated in InternationalShoe.4"
Having rejected the argument that the test of InternationalShoe
was too uncertain, the Court reiterated the conclusion that "all
39. Since the Society, an out-of-state resident, sued in a state court, the issue of in
personarn jurisdiction over the Society never arose.
40. 554 F.2d at 749-50.
41. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
42. Id.at 207 (citation and footnotes omitted).
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assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." 43
It is submitted that while Shaffer did not require analysis of
whether the cause of action arose out of the defendants' contacts
with Delaware," as did Wilkerson, Shaffer cannot be read as watering down the requirements of due process.
In this author's opinion the result in Wilkerson is correct. Defendant conducted substantial business in Texas, thereby invoking
the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. It also seems
readily apparent that the cause of action arose out of those substantial contacts despite the Fifth Circuit's failure to analyze this issue.
Nevertheless, the due process analysis used in Wilkerson, that holds
that minimum contacts are not only necessary but also sufficient to
sustain in personam jurisdiction, remains open to serious criticism
because it employs irrelevant precedent to arrive at a misleading
conclusion.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Litigation between a hospital and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) concerning computation of Medicare 5 reimbursement payments produced three opinions by the
Fifth Circuit which raised significant issues of subject matter jurisdiction. In 1976, the Fifth Circuit held in Dr. John T. MacDonald
Foundation, Inc. v. Mathews (MacDonald I),"5 that despite provisions of the Social Security Act precluding review by "any person,
tribunal or governmental agency. . . ,"' section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 8 amounted to an independent grant of
subject matter jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, however, the United
States Supreme Court rejected that view in Califano v. Sanders.'
On rehearing (MacDonald II),50 the Fifth Circuit again found that
jurisdiction existed, not under section 10 of the APA, but pursuant
to general federal question jurisdiction as provided for in 28 U.S.C.
section 1331. Finally, the Fifth Circuit en banc (MacDonald III)"
43. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
44. See section IV of the majority opinion which clarifies that jurisdiction failed because
defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state. Id. at 213.
45. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
46. 534 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1976).

47. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
48.
49.
50.
51.

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
430 U.S. 99 (1977).
Dr. John T. MacDonald Found. v.Califano, 554 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1977).
Dr. John T. MacDonald Found. v.Califano, 571 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1978).
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found jurisdiction lacking under section 1331, but transferred the
case to the Court of Claims.
The problem-the extent to which Congress can close the
courts to a litigant raising a substantial federal claim-is an important one with an uncertain history. Article III of the United States
Constitution vests specific judicial powers in the United States Supreme Court and "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.""2 Jurisdiction is subject, however, to "such Exceptions and [to] such Regulations as the Congress shall make."5 On several occasions,5 4 the Supreme Court has
suggested that Congress may deprive federal courts of jurisdiction
entirely, regardless of the right asserted.
Sympathetic to the assertion of federal rights, federal courts
have labored to find jurisdiction despite an apparent congressional
intent to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.55 The MacDonald
trilogy reflects such an effort by the federal bench to provide appellate jurisdiction to a party aggrieved by governmental action.
Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation (the Foundation) was a
"provider of services" under the Medicare Act" and therefore entitled to reimbursement for costs of treatment of Medicare recipients.
From 1967 until 1972, the Foundation leased a portion of its premises to a group of radiologists. A dispute between HEW and the
Foundation arose over the Foundation's treatment of operating expenses of that portion of the hospital and income from the lease.
HEW contended that the Foundation's accounting would result in
52.
53.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

54. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Laufv. E. G. Shinner & Co.,
303 U.S. 323 (1938); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). But see Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
55. See, e.g., Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert: denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948). In Battaglia, plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to compensation
for time spent walking to their work stations, changing their clothes, and washing up after
work, consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Tennessee Coal Co. v.
Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). After the Tennessee Coal decision, however, Congress
enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), which overruled the decision retroactively. In addition, section 252(d) of the Act denied jurisdiction to
all courts. While the court in Battagliarejected the plaintiffs' claim on the merits, the Second
Circuit found that the due process clause limited Congress' power under the Exceptions and
Regulations provision. It stated: "[Wihile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of [federal) courts . . . it must not so exercise that power
as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .

.

. " 169

F.2d at 257 (footnote omitted). For a scholarly discussion of this problem, see Ratner,
CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 157 (1960).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (Supp. 111972).
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double payment by HEW for the same operating expenses and,
therefore, HEW reduced the reimbursement of costs by the amount
of the net lease income."
The Foundation filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida to require HEW to recompute the final administrative determination of reimbursement due the Foundation. The Foundation
claimed that the Secretary of HEW misinterpreted 20 C.F.R. section 405.486(b)(1) (1974), and that if the Secretary's interpretation
was correct, the Secretary lacked authority to promulgate the contested regulation. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants and the Foundation appealed."
In MacDonald I, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court
based on its finding that HEW had misinterpreted its regulation.
Before discussing the merits, however, the court addressed HEW's
contention that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. HEW
relied on section 405(h) of the Social Security Act (applicable to the
Medicare program under 42 U.S.C. section 1395 ii) which provides:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall
be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No
findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any
person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided.
No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under section [1331] of Title 28
to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter. 9
Despite the apparent jurisdictional bar of section 405(h), the Foundation argued that section 10 of the APA established an independent grant of jurisdiction.
A similar argument was raised and rejected in the United
States Supreme Court's decision Weinberger v. Salfi.10 In Salfi, a
widow sought judicial review of the denial of social security benefits
and argued that section 1331 conferred jurisdiction on the district
court despite section 405(h). The Supreme Court agreed that section
405(h) barred the challenge, but emphasized that section 405(g) 1
provided a congressionally-approved source of judicial review of
adverse administrative action. Thus, Salfi held that Congress had
57. 534 F.2d at 637-38.
58. On appeal, the Foundation contended for the first time that the Secretary's computation violated due process. 571 F.2d at 329-30.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
60. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).

19781

Civil Procedure

not precluded review entirely, rather that section 405(g) was the
only avenue for judicial review.
Although Congress made section 405(h) applicable to the Medicare program, it did not incorporate section 405(g) or otherwise
"herein provide" for judicial review of final agency action."2 Unlike
Salfi, therefore, denial of jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. section
1331 or section 10 of the APA foreclosed the litigant entirely from
judicial review. Under those facts, the Fifth Circuit had developed
an alternative source of jurisdiction under section 10 of the APA
which was delineated in Ortego v. Weinberger. 3 In Ortego, the Fifth
Circuit held that a court is bound by specific statutory review proce-

dures, but "where the act does not provide such procedures, . . .
'nonstatutory' review is still available.""4 Thus in MacDonald I, the
Fifth Circuit held that the court had jurisdiction to hear the Foundation's claim despite the absence of statutory authority.
Subsequently, HEW filed a motion for rehearing. That motion
was held in abeyance, pending decision by the Supreme Court in
Califano v. Sanders." Sanders arose under the Social Security Act,
which, as noted above, includes statutory review procedures. The
Supreme Court held that "the A.P.A. is not to be interpreted as an
implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions,"Is thus resolving a conflict among several courts of appeal and
an issue which sharply divided commentators. 7 In holding as it did,
the Supreme Court relied on a 1976 amendment to section 1331
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (Supp. 11 1972).
63. 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 1009 (citing Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971)). The
Second Circuit had also developed an alternative source of jurisdiction under section 10 of
the APA. As the Fifth Circuit noted in MacDonald I: "The Second Circuit has interpreted §
405(h) to preclude judicial review only if the Medicare Act establishes some procedures for
review of the Secretary's decision." 534 F.2d at 634. See also Kingsbrook Jewish Medical
Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 666-68 (2d Cir. 1973); Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d
397, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966) (interpreting
section 405(h) under the Social Security Act).
65. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
66. Id. at 105.
67. See id. at 104-05 n.5 (citing extensive commentary). In Sanders, the Court stated:
[Tihe actual text of § 10 of the APA nowhere contains an explicit grant of jurisdiction
to challenge agency action in the federal courts. Furthermore, even the advocates of
jurisdiction under the APA acknowledge that there is no basis for concluding that
Congress, in enacting § 10 of the APA, actually conceived of the Act in jurisdictional
terms. . . .Thus, the argument in favor of APA jurisdiction rests exclusively on the
broad policy consideration that, given the shortcomings of federal mandamus jurisdiction, such a construction is warranted by the rational policy of affording federal judicial review of actions by federal officials acting pursuant to federal law, notwithstanding the absence of the requisite jurisdictional amount.
Id. at 105-06 (citations and footnote omitted).
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exempting cases challenging agency action from the ten thousand
dollar jurisdictional requirement." The amendment was intended to
fill the jurisdictional void which prevented review of agency action.
At the same time, Congress retained 42 U.S.C. section 405(h) prescribing specific review procedures in cases arising under the Social
Security Act. Thus the Supreme Court stated, "[r]ead together,
the expansion of § 1331, coupled with the retention of [42 U.S.C. §
405(h)], apparently expresses Congress' view of the desired contours of federal-question jurisdiction over agency action.""9
In MacDonald II, the Fifth Circuit found that "our original
opinion erred as to this supposed head of jurisdiction.""0 It then
addressed a question reserved in MacDonaldI: whether general federal court jurisdiction obtains despite absence of a statutory grant
of jurisdiction. The majority framed the issue as one of congressional intent: whether Congress intended, by omission of the review
procedure outlined in section 405(g) of the Social Security Act from
the Medicare Act, that "during the time-window from 1968 to 1973
there should be no review of such Medicare matters as this?"'" The
court was unable to accept the arbitrary result dictated by the
"assumption" of section 405(h) that some review would be provided
by Congress' failure to do so.72 While admitting that "[their] construction [was] strained,"73 the majority held that Congress did not
intend section 405(h) to preclude jurisdiction and that, therefore,
jurisdiction could be obtained under section 1331.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States except
that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the
United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official
capacity.
(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the
United States, where the plaintiff if finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than
the sum or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to
which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interests and
costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose
costs on the plaintiff.
69. 430 U.S. at 106.
70. 554 F.2d at 715.
71. Id. at 716.
72. The court stated:
[Dlissatisfaction grows as we contemplate an apparently wayward preclusion of statutory review during a limited time frame [between 1968 and 1973], a hiatus remedied
when Congress got around to the matter again. Several courts have labored mightily
to avoid the irrational result which a mechanical construction of this peculiar statutory
collage produces.
68.

Id.
73.: Id. at 718.
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In MacDonald III, the court en banc disagreed with the panel
and dismissed the appeal,74 relying on Salfi which, as discussed
above, held that section 1331 jurisdiction was not available for review of agency decisions under the Social Security Act. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Foundation's effort to distinguish Salfi.75
It should be noted again that Salfi did not foreclose judicial
review of the litigant's claim, but merely held that Congress may
provide specific procedures for that review. In that sense, Salfi is
consistent with a long line of cases which recognize Congress' power
to impose conditions on appellate review."6 Salfi, however, cannot
be read as holding that review may be eliminated entirely." Furthermore, there is "a well-established principle that when constitutional questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is
presumed" and a court will read a statutory scheme as foreclosing
jurisdiction only if Congress' intent to do so is manifested by clear
and convincing evidence."8 The strictness of the presumption has
avoided the need for courts to decide whether Congress could close
all courts to a litigant with a federal claim.
The Fifth Circuit similarly avoided this issue: "Happily, we
74. Dr. John T. MacDonald Found. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1978). Initially
the court reviewed precedent in other jurisdictions. The Eighth Circuit had previously held
that section 405(h) precluded review of findings of fact and law, but that it could not preclude
jurisdiction over a constitutional claim. St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d
283 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). The Second and Seventh Circuits had found
that section 405(h) precluded review by the district court, but that the Court of Claims did
have jurisdiction. Trinity Memorial Hosp. of Cudahy, Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc.,
570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977); South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d
910 (2d Cir. 1976). The Court of Claims agreed with this conclusion. Whitecliff, Inc. v. United
States, 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. of Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
75. In so holding, the court stated:
[Blecause the instant litigation arose under the Medicare Act, Salfi is not binding
on us. We are not convinced, however, that factors sufficiently distinguishing the
instant case from the Salfi situation exist to warrant a different result. In Salfi, the
Court made it abundantly clear that the presence of a constitution [sic] claim will
not overcome the statutory preclusion of review and that neither the merits nor the
constitutional claim will be reviewed. Additionally, the legislative history of both §
405(h) and-§ 1395 ii of the Medicare Act support this view. . . . [Allthough Congress
expressly incorporated § 405(h) by reference, they failed to incorporate § 405(g) which
provides the administrative and judicial review procedures for the Social Security Act.
Assuming that when Congress incorporates sections specifically they intend to eschew
the remainder, the conclusion is inescapable that § 405(h) was intended to preclude
all review.
571 F.2d at 331 (footnote omitted).
76. See note 55 supra.
77. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109. In both Sanders and Salfi, although the
Social Security Act limited judicial review, review was not entirely precluded.
78. id.
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need resolve neither Congress' intent to preclude review of constitutional claims nor the constitutionality of a statute so construed." 7
However, it is submitted that the route taken was somewhat curious. The Court of Claims previously held that it had jurisdiction
to review claims arising under the Medicare Act in Whitecliff, Inc.
v. United States.'"Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review a decision by the Court of Claims. Thus, because
the Court of Claims is an article III court, all review is not foreclosed
and the constitutionality of section 405(h) did not have to be decided.
The problem with the court's reliance on Whitecliff is that decisions finding jurisdiction in the Court of Claims are open to serious
challenge. Section 405(h) denied review under section 41 of Title
28, s ' the predecessor of section 1331, and did not exclude review
under 28 U.S.C. section 1491, the source of jurisdiction in the Court
of Claims. The first prohibition of section 405(h), however, is that
"[n]o findings shall be reviewed . . . except as herein provided." 82

A finding that section 1491 creates jurisdiction is as strained as the
court's holding in MacDonald II, rejected by the court en banc in
MacDonald III. Arguably, the en banc decision could be justified as
an instance of a court's justifiable hesitance to decide a constitutional question when an alternative rationale is available. Nonetheless, MacDonald III contains an ironic circularity: the rationale
rejected by the court en banc, because adopted by the Court of
Claims, sustained the court's en banc holding that jurisdiction existed to review HEW's Medicare reimbursement decisions. Finally,
no matter how one views the logic of MacDonald III, or for that
matter, of MacDonaldII, the tortuous litigation shows the strenuous
exertion of judicial labor to find jurisdiction thus permitting an
aggrieved litigant to have his day in federal court.
In another important case dealing with subject matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit dealt briefly with the 'subtle and complex
question with far-reaching implications,'

. .

. : whether the doctrine

of pendent jurisdiction extends to confer jurisdiction over a party as
to whom no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists." 8 In
79. 571 F.2d at 332.
80. 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. of Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
81. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091 (1911) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970)).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
83. See, e.g., Suler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
84. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1976) (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S.
707, 720 (1975); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973)).
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Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc.,5 the
court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to employ pendent party jurisdiction.
The litigation arose under the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974 (the Planning Act)." Congress
intended the Planning Act to rectify spiraling costs of and unequal
access to health care facilities by developing a comprehensive approach to maldistribution and unnecessary duplication of services. 7
Pursuant to section 3001 of the Planning Act,"s the Secretary of
HEW designated regional health service areas throughout the country. On September 21, 1976, the Secretary named Texas Area 5
Health Systems Agency (HSA) the health systems agency for a
nineteen county region in north central Texas.
The Planning Act further provided for a board of directors and
an executive committee composed of providers and consumers of
health services.89 Although the board and the committee of HSA
included the requisite majority of consumers, Texas Acorn, a consumers group, challenged their composition in an action for declaratory, mandatory, and injunctive relief filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The complaint
alleged a failure of HSA's board to be "broadly representative of the
social, economic, linguistic and racial populations, . . .of the
health service area, and major purchasers of health care,""0 because
only two of the thirteen consumers on the board had family incomes
under ten thousand dollars, the median income for Texas Area 5.
The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, and HSA and HEW appealed the court's order
enjoining HSA from all operations." The Fifth Circuit vacated the
order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the low income members of the region were adequately represented by current board members.
Apart from its interpretation of the Planning Act, Texas Acorn
is noteworthy because of its jurisdictional holding. Jurisdiction over
85. 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (Supp. IV 1974).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (Supp. IV 1974).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1974).
90. 559 F.2d at 1021-22 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1974)) (footnotes omitted).
91. The appellants challenged the district court's construction of the Planning Act, the
adequacy of HEW's answer, and the appropriate standard of review. The order of the district
court was vacated and remanded on questions unrelated to the jurisdictional issue.
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HEW presented little problem because plaintiffs' complaint raised
a federal question. Because the Planning Act contained no separate
jurisdictional grant, plaintiffs had to rely on 28 U.S.C. section
1331(a); however, they did not have to allege that the amount-incontroversy exceeded ten thousand dollars because HEW is an
agency of the United States."
The court held, however, that plaintiffs had to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy in its action against HSA. Unable to do so,93
plaintiffs argued that the district court should exercise pendent
jurisdiction over the "non-federal" defendant. 4 However, the court
rejected this argument, stating that "the HSA may not be brought
into the suit as pendent parties unless an independent basis of jurisdiction over it exists."95
If the instant case were tested only by the standards articulated
in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs0 governing pendent claims, jurisdiction would lie. Gibbs held that as a matter of article III judicial
power, pendent jurisdiction exists whenever federal and pendent
claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and are
the kinds of claims, regardless of their origin, that a plaintiff "would
ordinarily be expected to try . . .all in one judicial proceeding
... ," In Texas Acorn, the common nucleus was HEW's selection
of the board of HSA, an allegedly improperly constituted body. The
court's decision to enjoin HSA from operating and to compel HEW
92. See note 68 supra.
93. The court stated that Texas Acorn could not show the requisite amount-incontroversy:
They have not offered any evidence of potential or direct injury to themselves, beyond
merely pointing out that the HSA has received funds totalling $771,535 from HEW and
will probably receive millions of dollars within the next several years. Surely a plaintiff
cannot satisfy the jurisdictional amount any time a private defendant's annual budget
exceeds $10,000. . . .In actions for injunctive and declaratory relief, the jurisdictional
amount is the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be
prevented.
559 F.2d at 1023 (citations omitted). The right demanded was reconstitution of the board.
Each individual's damages were speculative and de minimis and could not be aggregated.
Thus, plaintiffs could not meet the jurisdictional amount. See Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
94. The court characterizes HSA as "non-federal." 559 F.2d at 1023. This is a curious
term, for certainly Texas Acorn's only claim against HSA is a federal claim.
95. Id. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). It is submitted that this statement is somewhat ludicrous in light of the fact that an independent basis of jurisdiction would
preclude the need to employ pendent jurisdiction. In any event, having made such a determination, the court does not consider whether pendent jurisdiction, on these facts, would meet
the requirements set forth in A Idinger.
96. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
97. Id. at 725.
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to appoint a different board turns on the resolution of a single factual issue: the adequacy of the board's representative status.
Originally, pendent jurisdiction was employed only when the
same parties were already before the court. However, several federal
courts used the concept to obtain jurisdiction over a non-federal
party if he was a defendant to a claim closely related to the federal
claim already before the court." In response to this expansion by
the lower courts, the United States Supreme Court cautiously narrowed the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction in Aldinger v.
5
Howard."
In Aldinger, the Supreme Court stated that whether pendent
jurisdiction applied to non-federal defendants depended on whether
a federal cause of action could be stated against them, and on "the
deductions which may be drawn from congressional statutes as to
whether Congress wanted to grant this sort of jurisdiction to federal
courts."'°
In Texas Acorn, article III did not preclude plaintiffs' action
against HSA. HSA did not and could not allege that plaintiffs failed
to state a federal cause of action against it. The Fifth Circuit held
only that the jurisdictional amount was lacking, not the appropriate
federal law giving rise to the claim. Thus, the court should have
inquired whether Congress had expressly or impliedly negated jurisdiction in the case before it.
It is clear that section 1331(a) precludes actions in which the
jurisdictional amount is not met. Whenever pendent jurisdiction is
invoked, there will be a statutory bar to original jurisdiction over the
particular claim or party. Therefore, unless Aldinger meant much
more than it said, the inquiry must be whether under the particular
facts Congress would have negated jurisdiction, rather than
whether. generally such parties are to be exempted. Restated, as a
general rule, a party does not have to answer federal claims under
section 1331(a) unless the jurisdictional amount is met, but it is
submitted that a court must first inquire whether it would have
been Congress' intent to exempt a party from this jurisdictional
amount requirement before the court denies jurisdiction.
98. See, e.g., Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's Best,
Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap,
Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1968).
99. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
100. Id. at 17.
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Texas Acorn presents a compelling case for application of pendent party jurisdiction. First, there was only one constitutional
"case" as required by Gibbs. Second, HSA was a federal defendant.
The obvious reason for caution in expanding pendent jurisdiction is
comity between federal and state powers.' 0' However, there was no
state interest intruded upon by the exercise of federal jurisdiction.' 2
Finally, the clear purpose of the jurisdictional amount is to prevent
burdening federal courts with trivial cases.'0 3 Once the case is before
the court, that congressional purpose pales; at that juncture, judicial economy and efficiency militate strongly in favor of the exercise
of jurisdiction.
Intervention
The Fifth Circuit addressed various problems arising under rule
24' °0 which provides for intervention. The cases discussed herein
offer an excellent exposition of this rule.
Rule 24 permits a person, not a named party in a lawsuit, to
intervene directly in an action which might impede his rights. Rule
24(a)(1) contemplates intervention as of right when a statute confers that right, 05 while rule 24(a)(2) contemplates such:
[Wihen the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.10'
101.
as

See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 1 at 2 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited

WRIGHT]:

There is a recurring temptation to view questions of federal jurisdiction as if they were
simple procedural questions, to be resolved in whatever fashion will best serve the
desirable goal of efficient judicial administration. . . . But when it is remembered
that the delicate balance of a federal system is at stake, and that expansion of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts diminishes the power of the states, it is apparent
that efficiency cannot be the sole or the controlling consideration.
102. Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 15 (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker
Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972)):
The value of efficiency in the disposition of lawsuits by avoiding multiplicity may be
readily conceded, but that is not the only consideration a federal court should take into
account in assessing the presence or absence of jurisdiction. Especially is this true
where, as here, the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available without question in
the state courts.
103. See Senate Committee's statement on increasing jurisdictional amount to $10,000.
The federal courts should not "fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies." S.
REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. 3099, 3101 (1958).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
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Rule 24(b) governs permissive intervention and provides a convenient forum for a litigant whose claim shares a common question of
law or fact with a suit already in progress." °7 A precondition of all
applications to intervene is that the request be timely." 8
Read together, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries,
Inc."' and Stallworth v. Monsanto Co. offer extensive treatment
of the timeliness requirement.
On April 12, 1974, the United States, on behalf of the Secretary
of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), filed a complaint against major steel producers, including Allegheny-Ludlum and United Steel Workers of America,
under section 707 of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."' The
complaint alleged an illegal pattern or practice of employment discrimination, the companies' failure to comply with an executive
order, and the union's interference with compliance by the companies. On the same day, the district court entered two consent decrees. Consent Decree I, the decree relevant to Allegheny-Ludlum,
was "designed to correct the continuing effects of past discriminatory hiring, initial assignment, promotion, and transfer practices."" 2
On January 29, 1975, appellants, the union's justice committee
and fifty industry employees, filed a motion to intervene in the
district court in an attempt to void the decree because its implementation allegedly had an adverse effect on their earnings and
employment. At that time, the Fifth Circuit had before it
Allegheny-Ludlum I, an appeal from the district court's decision
that the consent decrees were legal. The district court, therefore,
held that until a decision was rendered in Allegheny-Ludlum I, it
lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding in Allegheny-Ludlum I on August 18,
1975. On March 22, 1976, the district court denied the pending
motion to intervene on the alternate grounds that the appellants
had no right to do so"' and that their motion was not timely. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 24. See also Cohn v. EEOC, 569 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1978).
109. 553 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
110. 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
112. 553 F.2d at 452.
113. A would-be intervenor must show a "direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings." Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970) (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1968)). For
additional discussion of this problem, see notes 128-45 infra, and accompanying text.
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While rule 24(a)(2) is framed in terms of a litigant's right to
intervene, the determination of timeliness is within the discretion
of the trial court and is disturbed on review only for an abuse of
that discretion." 4 In affirming the district court's order, the Fifth
Circuit relied on the extensive delay between the date of the decree
and efforts by appellants to intervene. Noting that post-judgment
intervention is rare," 5 the court relied on appellants' failure to explain their delay and on the prejudice to the other litigants if appellants were allowed to intervene after significant time had elapsed."
It is submitted that the factors of delay and prejudice were
obviously relevant in the Fifth Circuit's consideration of the timeliness issue. However, the court specifically avoided an issue resolved
against appellants by the district court: whether they had a protectable interest at stake. While timeliness is a prerequisite under both
rule 24(a) and (b), a foremost authority in the field of federal civil
procedure has stated that "in intervention of right situations the
applicant may be seriously harmed if he is not permitted to intervene, [therefore,] courts should be especially reluctant to dismiss
such applications as untimely.""' 7 Because timeliness is determined
from all the circumstances," 8 whether a party will effectively be
denied an alternative forum is certainly a relevant circumstance.
Stallworth v. Monsanto Co." 9 presents the timeliness problem
in considerable depth. The original action was brought by black
employees, as a class action, against their employer, Monsanto, for
various discriminatory hiring, promotion, and lay-off practices. 2 0
Plaintiffs filed the complaint on April 13, 1973. Approximately one
year later, they moved for partial summary judgment and for a
preliminary injunction. Prior to a hearing on plaintiffs' motion, defendant's counsel expressed the view that the remedies sought
See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
1916 (1972).
115. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Blue
Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd sub noma., Thrifty Shoppers Scrip.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
116. The court stated: "Intervention now . . .will prejudice the appellees by jeopardizing months of negotiations, causing substantial litigation expenses, and even more substantial expenses of implementation. The applicants knew of the consent agreement three days
after the suit was filed. . . .To allow the applicants to intervene now would disrupt carefully
considered proceedings." 553 F.2d at 453.
117. WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 75 at 372 (citing Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970)).
118. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973).
119. 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977).
120. Suit was commenced under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
114.
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would adversely affect some of defendant's white employees and
suggested that those employees be given notice so that they might
intervene. The court denied defendant's request to post notice of the
suit.
On September 12, 1974, the court granted partial summary
judgment and enjoined some of defendant's hiring practices. Prior
to trial on the remaining issues, the parties reached a settlement
and the court entered a consent decree. The section of the decree
relevant to intervention provided for abolition of departmental seniority rights and certain residency requirements. The court entered
an injunction on March 7, 1975, to implement this decree.
On March 17, defendant began implementation of the consent
decree by modifying rollbacks, which had been announced prior to
the decree, to conform to the new seniority provisions. At this point,
when defendant moved appellants to lower paying jobs, not in line
with pre-decree seniority, appellants became aware of the impact
that the original lawsuit had on their interests.
On April 4, 1975, appellants filed their motion to intervene as
plaintiffs.' On April 21, the district court denied the motion as
untimely because it found that appellants must have known of the
pendency of the lawsuit well in advance of their petition to intervene
and that appellants offered no excuse for the delay.
The Fifth Circuit noted that "timeliness" is not defined by rule
24; nor is it illustrated by the Advisory Committee note to that
rule.' Moreover, the term is not one "of exactitude or of precisely
measurable dimensions."'' 3 Thus, the question is remitted to the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Stallworth is noteworthy for its effort to formulate specific
guidelines to measure timeliness despite the elusiveness of the concept. In order to establish these guidelines, the court analyzed the
rule itself, United States Supreme Court precedent, and Fifth Circuit precedent. These guidelines include: (1) the length of time that
the party seeking intervention knew or should have known of his
121. In the complaint, appellants alleged that the abolition of the seniority system
breached their contract with defendant and that provisions of the consent decree amounted
to an abuse of discretion because it was unnecessarily broad and allowed other white employees to be accelerated ahead of appellants. 558 F.2d at 262. At this procedural juncture,
appellants also filed a motion to reopen the consent decree under FED. R. Cw. P. 60(b). Id.
Disposition of that motion had no effect on the original question of intervention.
122. Id. at 263.
123. Id. (quoting McDonald v. E. J. Lavino, Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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interest in the litigation before he petitioned to intervene,'24 (2) the
prejudice to the parties to the suit caused by the lapse between the
intervenor's knowledge and his petition,'25 (3) the extent of prejudice
to the intervenor if his motion is denied,' 28 and (4) the existence of
any unusual circumstances for or against a finding of timeliness.
The first guideline obviates the need for the time consuming
and expensive "protective" motions before the issues in the cases
are clearly framed. Consistent with the practical emphasis of rule
24, similarly, Stallworth's second guideline, that the court consider
only additional prejudice caused by the delay, is consistent with the
general view that the court should favor intervention, subject to
necessary limiting conditions.
After articulation of these guidelines, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the lower court abused its discretion when it denied the
motion to intervene. First, the district court misconstrued the relevant event that made prompt intervention necessary. The only evidence on point revealed that the appellants did not know that the
litigation affected their interests until March 7, 1975. Appellants
were not required to fathom "the potential impact of this admit2
tedly complex case on their seniority rights at some earlier date."'1
Second, the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard to the
prejudice suffered by the parties. The Fifth Circuit found little prejudice caused by the delay between March 7, the relevant date under
the first factor, and April 4, the date of appellants' motion. The
court did not discuss the third guideline but found that the fourth
also favored intervention. Prior to the consent decree, defendant's
request that notice be given to white employees had been resisted
by plaintiffs and denied by the court. Because plaintiffs' action
prevented earlier intervention, the court considered plaintiffs estopped from complaining, at a later date, that appellants should
have intervened before April 4.121
124. Despite language to the contrary in NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973),
the court found clear support for its view in the more recent decision of United Airlines, Inc.
v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
125. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); McDonald v. E. J.
Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
126. See, e.g., Moten v. Bricklayers Int'l Union, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
127. 558 F.2d at 267.
128. The analysis at this juncture is somewhat curious. In discussing the first guideline,
the court emphasized that the employees would not recognize that their interests were at
stake at an earlier time. Thus, any attempts by plaintiffs to delay notice would seem irrelevant; the critical date under the first guideline is not the date of notice of suit, but the date
of notice that their interest would be impaired. Plaintiffs' action did not affect that date. Id.
at 264-65.
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Stallworth and Allegheny-Ludlum highlight the threshold
problem in determining whether a party may intervene. Furthermore, Stallworth is significant because it sets forth guidelines relevant to the principle of rule 24 which lend themselves to reasoned
application by the district courts. 2 '
The second requirement under rule 24(a)(2) is that the intervenor must show that he has an interest that will be affected by the
litigation. The term "interest" is imprecise and the Advisory Committee offers little assistance. The committee does note that the
amendment was intended to broaden former rule 24(a)(3) which
required the presence of a fund or other property. 130 The United
States Supreme Court has lent scant guidance on what constitutes
a sufficient interest to require intervention of right. As noted by
Professor Wright:
There is as yet no consensus about the kind of "interest" that the
would-be intervenor must have. Although the Supreme Court has
added the gloss that Rule 24(a)(2) is referring to "a significantly
protectable interest," this has not been a term of art in the law of
intervention and provides little more guidance than does the bare
3
term used in the rule itself.' '
Although the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in Stallworth, the
32
court offered little guidance to assist litigants and trial courts.
In Stallworth, after the court concluded that the motion to
intervene was timely, it addressed itself to the issue of whether the
other prerequisites under rule 24(a)(2) were present. The court
found that appellants were not adequately represented and that
whatever interest appellants had in the litigation would be impeded
unless they were permitted to intervene. Therefore, the court remanded for a determination of whether a cognizable interest existed.
The court recited the United States Supreme Court's formulation that an intervenor must possess a "significantly protectable
interest" in the subject matter of the suit.'33 Appellants contended
that the decree unnecessarily interfered with their contractual relations with the defendant. That issue had not been resolved by the
district court and required an evidentiary hearing. The Fifth Circuit
129. Id. at.264-66.
130. 39 F.R.D. 69, 109 (1966).
131. WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 75 at 370 (footnote omitted).
132. 567 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1978). See also discussion of United States v. Perry County
Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1978), notes 136-51 infra, and accompanying text.
133. 558 F.2d at 268 (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)).
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indicated that contractual rights would meet the interest test of rule
24(a)(2) because seniority advantages "represent an expectancy
whose significance is difficult to overemphasize, and which should
not be lightly or blindly swept aside."' 3 ' Thus framed, the issue
would be more properly resolved by the district court.
In addition, the court considered whether permissive intervention under rule 24(b) would be appropriate if the district court found
intervention of right inapplicable. Pursuant to rule 24(b), if an applicant can show a common question of law or fact, the court must
then exercise its discretion to determine the propriety of intervention. Since the district court never considered the issue of permissive intervention, the Fifth Circuit was not faced with determining
whether the lower court had abused its discretion. Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit strongly suggested that regardless of whether rule
24(a)(2) was applicable, the lower court should permit intervention
because "this appears to be a classic example of the type of case in
which the rights asserted by two groups of workers employed by the
same defendant should be adjudicated in one action rather than in
5
two.'

3

The Fifth Circuit also considered the interest test in United
States v. Perry County Board of Education.3 In Perry County
Board of Education, the United States commenced litigation
against the board in August 1966 to compel school desegregation
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' 37 In 1977, the board and a bi-racial
advisory committee approved plans for construction of two new
school facilities. The board then submitted the plans to the district
court that had jurisdiction over the desegregation plan. Appellants,
parents of school children, filed a motion to intervene which the
court denied on October 14, 1977; at this time the court also approved the construction plans. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, appellants contended alternatively that intervention was proper under
rule 24(a)(2) or rule 24(b)(2).
The court noted the imprecision of the interest required for
intervention of right and the need that the inquiry be "a flexible
one, which focuses on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each application .

.

...

"3

Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit

134. Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
135.

Id. at 270.

136. 567 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1978).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
138. 567 F.2d at 279 (quoting United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indust., Inc., 517 F.2d
826, 841 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976)).

1978]

Civil Procedure

has adopted a narrow reading of the requisite interest in that it must
be a "direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings."' 39 That standard has frequently prevented intervention by
children, parents, and teachers who have been aggrieved by a school
desegregation plan. Whether intervention be by right or permissive, 140 the intervenor must demonstrate an interest in a desegregated school system. The court, however, did not decide whether a
petitioner had a right to intervene if he alleged an interest in a
unitary school system because appellants failed to allege such an
interest. According to the court, the appellants attempted to question the desirability of constructing a centralized consolidated high
school; they did not challenge construction of the two schools on
grounds related to integration. The Civil Rights Act gave the court
jurisdiction over matters affecting desegregation, not over questions
of policy wholly unrelated to race.' '
It is submitted that the result in Perry County Board of
Education is unassailable because the trial court could not consider
the non-racial policy issue raised in the petition to intervene. Such
a result is only appropriate because in Perry County Board of
Education, the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the broad interest
4 In Smuck,
test applied in Smuck v. Hobson."'
the defendants, the
school board and the superintendent of schools, did not appeal a
district court finding that the District of Columbia's schools were
being operated in a manner that discriminated against the plaintiffs
on racial and economic bases.' Parents sought to intervene in order
to appeal the district court's order. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that the parents were entitled to intervene. The court made several interesting observations:
[1In the context of intervention the question is not whether a lawsuit
should be begun, but whether already initiated litigation should be,
extended to include additional parties. The 1966 amendments to Rule
24(a) have facilitated this. . . .It would be unfortunate to allow the
inquiry to be led once again astray by a myopic fixation upon
"interest". Rather, as Judge Leventhal recently concluded for this
139. Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 878 (1970) (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1968)).
140. Despite language in Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.
1973), the court found that the question was still an open one. Cf. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Indepen. School Dist., 560 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1977) (held 20 U.S.C. §§ 1654 and 1717 (1976)
did not create a right of intervention under rule 24(a)(1)).
141. The court also found that the district court's action in denying permissive intervention did not amount to an abuse of discretion. 567 F.2d at 280.
142. 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
143. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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Court, "a more instructive approach is to let our construction be
guided by the policies behind the 'interest' requirement.

.

.

. [T]he

'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits
by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible
with efficiency and due process."''

Thus, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals allows a low
threshold showing of interest because the other requirements of the
rule are more effective barriers to unmerited or inappropriate attempts to intervene and because the court may shape and narrow
intervention to the contours of the particular interest. By limiting
the scope of intervention, the court can protect the litigants' interest
in shaping the litigation while also maximizing protection for those

who may otherwise be denied a forum.
Absent a definitive holding by the United States Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit is not compelled to abandon its approach.' 5
The Smuck analysis is cited because it reads the several provisions
of rule 24(a) as being a flexible and integrated whole that avoids
rigid interpretation, an approach arguably consistent with the purpose of the 1966 amendment. By contrast, in Stallworth and Perry
County Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit has stated that impairment of rights under a contract is an interest cognizable under
the rule while the failure to allege any issues within the court's
jurisdiction is not such an interest. Unfortunately, trial courts are
likely to meet many hard cases between, not at, those two poles.
They do so aided only by the uncertain test that the interest must
be a significantly protectable interest. Furthermore, by allowing
litigants to be foreclosed by strict application of the interest test,
the Fifth Circuit hampers the rule's intended flexibility.
The additional requirements of rule 24(a)(2) are that the interest may be impaired or impeded, and that the parties to the action
do not adequately represent the intervenor's interest. Impairment
in Stallworth was obvious. The consent order had an immediate
effect on the appellants' seniority rights and the existence of the
order limited their ability to commence a separate proceeding. If
they commenced a separate proceeding and the court were to conclude that the claim was meritorious, it could not grant effective
relief without conflicting with the March 7 order.'
144. 408 F.2d at 179 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (1967)).
145. Although not clearly resolved, Supreme Court precedent can be read as considerably broader than the Fifth Circuit's approach to the problem. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
146. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). Cf. United
States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975) (held appellants had no right to
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In Stallworth, adequacy of representation did not present a
barrier to intervention. At one point in the proceedings, defendant
had raised a question concerning the interest of appellants in the
litigation. Furthermore, defendant had not opposed intervention
initially. However, when appellants modified their challenge to the
consent order to challenge only the acceleration of other whites,
defendant reversed itself and opposed intervention. Only when appellants modified their position did plaintiffs silence their opposition. The course of litigation demonstrated that plaintiffs' and
appellants' interests were at least potentially antogonistic. While
the litigants may have had interests similar to those of appellants
on some questions, those interests were never fully protected by
either party. This was particularly true after entry of the consent
decree." 7
One final aspect of intervention is noteworthy. If the trial court
grants the requested intervention, the parties to the litigation may
not appeal as of right."8 However, if the court denies the petition
for intervention, the law is well-settled that the order denying intervention of right is appealable. "9 Furthermore, an appellate court
will reverse if the lower court erroneously denied that right. The
Fifth Circuit follows an "anomalous rule" in this area. In
Stallworth, the court stated:
[W]e have provisional jurisdiction to determine whether the district
court erroneously concluded that the appellants were not entitled to
intervene as of right . . . or clearly abused its discretion in denying
their application for permissive intervention under section (b) of Rule
24. If we find that the district court's disposition of the petition was
correct, or within the ambit of its discretion, then our jurisdiction
evaporates because the proper denial of leave to intervene is not a
final decision, and we must dismiss . . . for want of jurisdiction.10
Despite the "evaporation" label, the court does consider the merits
of the intervenor's claim and therefore this approach has been criticized as being artificial.''
intervene to object to settlement with the defendant because by terms of the settlement, no
present or former employee of the defendant had to accept proffered payments and were
therefore free to initiate a separate action).
147. See Cohn v. EEOC, 569 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1978); United Brands Co. v. Melson,
569 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1978). Cf. United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. 1978) (representation deemed adequate).
148. See WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 75 at 374.
149. Cascade National Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519 (1947).
150. 558 F.2d at 263.
151. See, e.g., 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1923
(1972).
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Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express'52 illustrates the anomaly of
this rule in contrast to the ordinary rules governing judgment finality and appeals. On July 2, 1974, Huckeby, a secretary for defendant, filed a complaint alleging a violation of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.'53 In September 1973, would-be intervenor, Alice
Bobo, had filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) based on defendant's refusal to hire her as a
truck driver. The EEOC notified her on May 10, 1974, informing her
that she had ninety days in which to bring suit against defendant.
Due to a change of attorneys, the ninety day limitations period
lapsed before Bobo initiated suit; therefore, she petitioned for leave
to intervene in Huckeby's suit. The trial court granted the petition
ex parte. Bobo subsequently filed her complaint alleging sex discrimination in defendant's hiring practices. Defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction due
to the running of the limitations period and that Bobo did not
satisfy requirements for intervention under either rule 24(a)(2) or
24(b)(2). The district court dismissed Bobo's complaint, but did not
vacate its order permitting intervention and did not enter a final
order against her.
As noted above, the rule governing immediate appeal from the
denial of a motion to intervene is an anomaly. The general rule, even
in multiparty litigation, is that appeal may only be taken from a
final order.'54 Failure by a party to appeal a final order, because the
party believed it to be interlocutory, has caused harsh results in
multiparty and multiclaim litigation.'55 To alleviate the problem,
rule 54(b)'56 was amended to allow the district court to enter judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
in multiclaim and multiparty cases. The order is final only if the
court makes an express determination that there is no reason to
delay appeal, and if the court expressly directs entry of the judgment.' 7
In Huckeby, the court noted that the district court had not
certified the dismissal of Bobo's complaint for immediate appeal,
nor had Bobo requested certification. Furthermore, Bobo could not
152. 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1977).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
154. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
155. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
157. See Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1978); 10 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2654 (1973).
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point to any other exception to rules governing judgment finality
which would give sanction to her appeal.' 8
Bobo argued that certification under rule 54(b) was unnecessary because her appeal was from an order refusing leave to intervene. As discussed above, such orders, subject to the "evaporating"
jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, are immediately appealable. Even
though the trial court initially granted the motion to intervene, had
it then dismissed and vacated the order, the legal effect would have
been the same as an original dismissal.' The Fifth Circuit found,
however, that the lower court dismissed because Bobo's suit was
untimely; thus, the dismissal order was within the general rules
governing appeals from interlocutory orders. Although Bobo was not
allowed to intervene in Huckeby's suit, dismissal of her complaint
did not terminate that litigation.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed for want of jurisdiction because of
Bobo's failure to comply with rule 54(b). The court suggested that
on remand the district court should consider the appropriateness of
rule 54(b) certification should Bobo request such. The court explicitly declined to intimate whether this was an appropriate case for
such relief.
Huckeby, although factually unusual, presents an excellent illustration of the varied approaches to judgment finality. The same
policy underlies both rule 54(b) and the intervention exception to
finality. Both mitigate the potential for harm to a litigant involved
in expanded litigation. However, the formal requirements for rule
24 and rule 54(b) have developed independently. Rules governing
appeals from orders denying motions to intervene have evolved by
judicial decision.16 0 Rule 54(b) established a procedure to eliminate
guesswork by the litigants as to whether an order is final. Huckeby
involved an issue arguably ripe for appeal, but illustrates the distinct routes to be followed depending on the nature of the order
appealed from. Once it was clear that the appeal was within rule
54(b), the criteria for appeal were applied strictly, typical of the law
governing appellate court jurisdiction. 6 '
158. It was not within 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970) or in decision created exceptions for
immediate appeals of collateral matters. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949); Forguay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848); United States v. Wood,
295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
159. See Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1976).
160. See WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 75 at 374 & nn.48-50.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227 (1958).
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Private Causes of Action

It has been stated:
[Where-ever a statute enacts anything or prohibits anything, for
the advantage of any person, that person shall have remedy to recover
the advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the injury done
him contrary to law by the same statute; for it would be a fine thing
to make a law by which one has a right, but no remedy ....
"62
Unless jurisprudence is to become enveloped in a "Catch 22,"
the inescapable logic of the cited passage: where there is a legal
right, there is also a remedy, must be acknowledged. For over two
hundred and fifty years the British courts have implied a private
cause of action absent an express remedy. Although the United
States Supreme Court did not consider the issue until 1916,63 the
practice of implying a private cause of action absent an express
remedy became well-established during the post-World War II expansion of federal judicial influence. 6' In 1971, in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 1 5 the United States Supreme
Court held unequivocally that a plaintiff stated a private cause of
action cognizable in a federal court when he alleged a violation of
the fourth amendment. While the Burger Court has been more cautious in expanding implied causes of action than the Warren
Court, 6 it has not overruled or criticized the holding in Bivens.
Since Bivens, courts of appeals and district courts have frequently, if without uniform results, addressed the appropriate limits
of the Bivens holding.' Recently, the Fifth Circuit en banc squarely
addressed this problem in Davis v. Passman.6 This case provides
a detailed analysis of whether a plaintiff states a private cause of
action for damages when she alleges a violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. " Because Davis is undoubtedly the
162. McMahon & Rodos, JudicialImplication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal
and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167, 168 (1975) [hereinafter cited as McMahon &
Rodos] (quoting Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791 (Q.B. 1703)) (footnotes omitted). The
article offers an excellent discussion of the problem of implied causes of action generally
and of the retrenchment of the Burger Court in this area.
163. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
164. See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 162 at 169-76.
165. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
166. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414
U.S. 453 (1974).
167. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 795-96 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing extensive
authority). See also dissenting opinion of Judge Goldberg. Id. at 807-08 n.6.
168. 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978).
169. Davis unquestionably involves the problem of the appropriateness of the federal
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most significant case decided by the Fifth Circuit in the area of civil
procedure during the period covered by the symposium, its importance mandates serious critical analysis and, it is hoped, further
judicial scrutiny.
In 1974, Ms. Davis was Deputy Administrative Assistant to
Congressman Otto Passman of Louisiana's Fifth Congressional District. Passman terminated Ms. Davis' employment, effective July
31, 1974, and explained his reasons in an extraordinarily candid
letter. The letter stated in part:
You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you command the respect of those with whom you work; however, on account
of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the
diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe you will
agree with this conclusion. 170
Having received this letter, Ms. Davis filed suit against Passman
claiming that the congressman had violated the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment due process clause. 7 ' She alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. section 1331(a)"' and sought
specific relief, damages, and declaratory relief. Because Passman's
tenure in Congress ended after the suit commenced, Ms. Davis' only
remedy was damages against Passman in his individual capacity.
The district court dismissed the complaint under rule 12(b)(6)' 73 for
failure to state a cause of action because "the law affords . . .no

private right of action"' 7 to plaintiff for the alleged constitutional
violation. Furthermore, the court found no violation of the fifth
amendment. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court
and remanded the case for trial.175 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit
court implying a cause of action. That is clear from the statement of the issue by the court
en banc and its discussion of precedent. In the course of the opinion, the court does use
jurisdictional language. Id. at 801. It is assumed that the reference is inadvertent. Although
there was no practical difference in Davis, the distinction between rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction can be significant. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) and
12(h)(3). For example, had Ms. Davis combined a nonfrivolous federal question (apparently,
her federal question was not frivolous) with a state claim, the district court would have had
jurisdiction to hear the state claim whether or not the court subsequently dismissed the
federal claim because no private remedy was available. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
170. 571 F.2d at 806 n.1 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
172. See note 68 supra.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
174. 571 F.2d at 795.
175. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). The court also addressed problems
of sovereign immunity, the speech and debate clause, and the limits of qualified immunity,
but found that none of these doctrines barred suit against Passman individually. Id. at 877.
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granted Passman's petition for rehearing en banc. 76 In the rehearing, a majority of the court affirmed the lower court's decision on
the ground that Ms. Davis had failed to state a cause of action.
Initially, the court recognized that Bivens was the starting
point for its analysis. In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court
had noted that historically damages have been regarded as the
"ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty."' 77
However, the Fifth Circuit cited extensive authority from other federal courts indicating that the limits of Bivens have not been clearly
marked. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically commented that the question of whether an action for damages may be
implied from the due process clause remains open.' The Fifth Circuit considered its own precedent on point to be equivocal.' Therefore, although guideposts were available, the court en banc resolved
the question without resort to clearly binding precedent.
Initially, the Fifth Circuit was faced with the problem that
Bivens appeared to control the case before the court. However, the
court rejected the view that the cause of action in Bivens was constitutionally compelled. This view was supported by language found
in Bivens where the majority stated:
[W]e cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as
whether the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the
Fourth Amendment. For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the
Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the
agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view of Congress.1
In light of this language, and the Bivens' Court's reliance on cases
in which the issue was whether a remedy could be implied from a
federal statute, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Bivens did not hold
176. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978). The petition raised claims relating
to the speech and debate clause and the political question doctrine. The court en banc did
not reach these issues. But see Judge Jones' opinion specially concurring. Id. at 801.

177. 403 U.S. at 395.
178. See Mount Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277 (1977); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1976); City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 284 n.1 (1976); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33
(1973). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 514 (1973).
179. See Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976), overruled in part, Davis v.
Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 801 (1978). See also Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 (5th
Cir. 1976); Roane v. Callisburg Indepen. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 635 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975);
United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 801-02
(5th Cir. 1974); Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974).
180. 403 U.S. at 397.
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that the Constitution mandated a remedy for the fourth amendment. Instead, the court found that the existence of a remedy was
a matter of federal common law, and was within the power of Congress to amend or withdraw. Thus, the court restated the issue in
Davis as follows:
First, we look to the jurisprudence of statutory implication to determine whether to imply a damage action of non-constitutional dimensions. Second, if this initial inquiry does not suggest that such an
action should be implied, we must determine whether the Constitution nevertheless compels the existence of a remedy in damages to
vindicate the rights asserted. 8'
With the issue thus framed, the court then considered the Supreme Court's extensive discussion of implied private causes of action in Cort v. Ash. 8I Cort requires consideration of four factors: (1)
whether the provision asserted as the basis of the cause of action
creates an especial right in the plaintiff; (2) whether congressional
enactment indicates an intent to allow the remedy; (3) whether
implication of the particular remedy would be consistent with the
statutory scheme or with the purpose of the constitutional right
asserted; and (4) whether the cause of action is appropriate for
federal law or instead whether it is "one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States ... "83
The Fifth Circuit's discussion of the first factor is curious. The
court concedes that the fifth amendment confers a right on Ms.
Davis. Rephrased, the fifth amendment, like the fourth amendment, creates an especial right in all individuals in the United
States. But the Fifth Circuit found that the right had to be "a
clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff . . .[and that] the
injury alleged here does not infringe [Ms. Davis' due process] right
as directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable search of
Webster Bivens offended the fourth amendment."'8 4 As will be discussed in greater depth, the court's conclusion appears to be selfcontradictory; "[wihile the fifth amendment Due Process Clause
surely exists for the 'especial benefit' of Davis, as Cort required, it
does not exist with equal certainty to protect her tenure in a noncompetitive personal aide position statutorily denominated as ser' 5
vice at will."' 1
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

571 F.2d at 797.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Id. at 78.
571 F.2d at 797 (citations omitted).
Id. at 797-98.
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Perhaps of more importance was the Fifth Circuit's analysis of
the second and third criteria delineated in Cort. As cited above,
there was language in Bivens that indicated that a congressionally
created remedy was relevant to the need to imply an additional
remedy. In Bivens, however, Congress had not enacted such legislation." The Fifth Circuit found that Congress clearly intended to
exempt non-competitive federal employees from available statutory
relief. Section 701 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act originally exempted
the federal government from the definition of "employer," thereby
denying damages to federal employees."' Subsequently, Congress
created a separate administrative remedy for discrimination in federal employment, but exempted non-competitive jobholders.s8
Under this statutory scheme, Ms. Davis, therefore, could be removed "at any time . . . with or without cause.""' Thus, acording
to the Fifth Circuit, if the court implied a damage remedy for Ms.
Davis, it would afford her greater relief than that provided federal
employees in the competitive service whom Congress specifically
intended to protect.
The third consideration is whether an implied cause of action
is consistent with the statutory scheme. Bivens did not address that
precise question, rather it dealt with a constitutional cause of action
where no statutory scheme existed. The Fifth Circuit analogized
Bivens' consideration of the particular difficulties presented in enforcing the fourth amendment to the Cort criterion: "The amendment's subject matter is such that law enforcement officials, who
necessarily make the searches and seizures it governs, are themselves the group most likely to be hostile to its barriers. . . . [T]he
Court continues to struggle for a just means for enforcing the fourth
amendment."'' 0 In addition, the court stated:
Violations of fourth amendment rights occur in a well-defined
setting familiar to the courts. . . . The context in which these violations may arise is sufficiently limited to allow the court to determine
that an action for damages would be consistent with the purpose of
the fourth amendment in future instances in which an action might
be involved. The fifth amendment Due Process Clause presents no
similarly focused remedial issue."'
186. See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger. 403 U.S. at 411. The Chief Justice
exorted Congress to act and found judge-made remedies an obstacle to that action. Id. at 424.
187. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. H 1972)).
188. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (Supp. II 1972).
189. 571 F.2d at 798 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 92 (1976)).
190. Id. at 799 (citations omitted).
191. Id.
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Furthermore, the court indicated that due process presumably includes too many concepts so that if a court allows relief now it
cannot predict how many other cases will arise in which similar
claims for damages will be made.
Finally, Cort mandates analysis of the nature of the claim to
determine whether in fact it is a matter traditionally relegated to
state law. The court conceded that Ms. Davis' claim involved only
a federal right. But because of the flexibility of due process, the
court feared:
Adoption of Davis' interpretation of Bivens would project the
penumbra federal court constitutional due process jurisdiction over
every legally cognizable tortious injury inflicted by persons acting
under color of federal law because, by its nature, every tort deprives
the victim of due process through unlawful appropriation of liberty
or property or both."'
In fact, such a holding in the court's view would include all state
tort claims because the federal court would have pendent jurisdiction, or because the tort claim would be labelled a violation of
fourteenth amendment due process and the court would imply a
private cause of action. Furthermore, the federal courts would not
be able to withstand the deluge. Thus, the court concluded that it
would be impractical and unnecessary to imply a cause of action
from the equal protection clause.
Having resolved the common law question, the Fifth Circuit
faced the second inquiry of whether the damage remedy was constitutionally compelled. The court read Bivens as irrelevant to this
inquiry but found guidance in Paul v. Davis,"3 which, the court
conceded, was not perfectly analogous with Davis. In Paul, the
United States Supreme Court noted that under section 1983 "'the
range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite.' "I" The Fifth Circuit read Paul as counselling restraint in
providing relief under the Constitution.
According to the court "[d]enying an implied cause of action
for money damages does not render meaningless any constitutional
rights of congressional employees.""' 5 The court explicitly stated
that a plaintiff could seek injunctive relief if the employer remained
in office. The fact that employees in non-competitive service whose
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 709 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972)).
571 F.2d at 800.
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employers are no longer in office may be without a remedy for sex
discrimination does not mandate that a cause of action be implied.
Other due process wrongs would continue to be remedied and the
constitutional guarantee protected. The court further noted that
implying a private right of action in Davis would violate the constitutional limitation on federal judicial power.'"
It is this author's view that Davis is wrongly decided because
the court erroneously distinguished precedent, and unnecessarily
invoked the fear of a flood of cases if the court had implied a private
right of action.
The Fifth Circuit ignored the constitutional underpinning of
Bivens. The court relied on two arguments to avoid that view.
Taken out of sequence, the second is Bivens' reliance on cases which
implied the private cause of action from a statute."7 The Supreme
Court's reliance on statutory cases is understandable. Bivens was
the seminal case implying a private right of action from the Constitution. As noted in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, it would be
anomalous to allow an action for damages where the source of the
right was statutory while denying relief where the right originated
in the Constitution.'"
The Fifth Circuit's first argument rested on language in Bivens
which indicated that a different question would be before the Court
had Congress provided an alternative remedy. However, the Fifth
Circuit read too much into this language from Bivens. In Bivens, the
Supreme Court did not hold that the matter of remedies was
"merely" a question of federal common law. Instead, it deferred
answering a question not before it. The Supreme Court had previously discussed the problem in a related context and had stated:
Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for
the [Fifth amendment right to remain silent], so long as they are
fully as effective as those [provided by the Court]. . . . Where
rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
making or legislation which would abrogate them.'
196. U.S. CONST. art. III.
197. As stated in Bivens, "it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such an invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)) (emphasis added).
198. 403 U.S. at 403 (Harlan, J., concurring).
199. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490-91 (1966) (quoted by Judge Goldberg in the
dissenting opinion. 571 F.2d at 811) (emphasis added). In addition to Judge Goldberg's
excellent discussion in dissent, see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitutionas
a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532 (1972).
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The implication here is obvious: Congressional enactment will be
scrutinized not merely by common law standards, but by a principle
that constitutional rights must be made fully effective. 2® The Supreme Court had already established the exclusionary rule in an
effort to effectuate the fourth amendment. Bivens was necessary
because the existing remedy was not fully effective: "For people in
' 20 1
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.
Although the Fifth Circuit discussed related legislation, it
pointed to none which protected Ms. Davis, even though she was
subjected to aviolation of her due process right.0 2 It is submitted
that the facts of Davis are analogous to those of Bivens. In both
Bivens and Davis, a plaintiff's constitutional right was violated.
Although related remedies existed for other parties (e.g., administrative procedures for competitive federal job seekers; the exclusionary rule for those found with proceeds of crime), the party before the
court had no effective remedy. In Davis, the Fifth Circuit had the
historic authority to allow damages, as a result of the Supreme
Court having allowed such in Bivens, but it failed to do so.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of Cort raises additional problems.
Initially, in Bivens, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
created an especial right in the broadest class of people possible-all
individuals in the United States.0 3 The Fifth Circuit conceded that
Ms. Davis was entitled to fifth amendment protection but concluded that the due process clause "does not exist with equal certainty to protect her tenure in a non-competitive personal aide position statutorily denominated as service at will." 2 0' The argument is
self-contradictory: Ms. Davis' right to due process was violated because she was fired on the basis of her sex; but her right to due
process was not violated because she had no right to the job. 20 1 An
alternative reading may be possible: If Ms. Davis shows that a due
process right had been violated, she has met the first Cort criterion
but she has failed to show that she has been denied due process.
However, the court elsewhere implied that Ms. Davis' due process
right was violated and that the only issue was whether damages
200. See generally concurring opinion of Justice Harlan. 403 U.S. at 398-411.
201. 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
202. "[Tlhe fifth amendment . . certainly confers a right upon Davis .
571
F.2d at 797.
203. See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 162 at 171.
204. 571 F.2d at 798.
205. The court may mean that because the right is imprecise, it lends itself to broad
application in varied contexts. But that is also the court's argument under the third Cort
criterion. It seems out of place when discussing whether Ms. Davis has protection under the
fifth amendment.
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were appropriate. Furthermore, if the court thought that Ms. Davis
completely failed to state a cause of action, then discussion of the
broader and more complex problem of whether she has stated a
claim for damages, as opposed to a claim for equitable relief, would
have been unnecessary.10
The court more clearly concluded that an implied cause of action was disfavored in light of congressional intent. The argument
was straight forward: Congress gave competitive federal job seekers
an administrative remedy and expressly excluded non-competitive
workers. To hold that Ms. Davis had a right to damages would
afford her a greater remedy than federal employees specifically protected by statute. That argument is suspect because, as the dissent
in Davis stated:
Title VII, for those to whom it applies, lowers the bar of sovereign
immunity to permit a back pay award, together with possible equitable relief, directly against the United States. It also affords the possibility of relatively quick and inexpensive relief at the administrative
level. This seems to me no less favorable than a possible recovery
against a former congressman. 7
The statutory intent argument is singularly unpersuasive. An
examination of Cort and two similar Burger Court decisions illustrates why the Fifth Circuit's argument is misplaced.
The first case is National RailroadPassengerCorp. v. National
Association of Railroad Passengers,"' known as the Amtrak case.
Litigation involved the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (the Rail
Act) °9 which disallowed discontinuance of intercity rail service except as provided in the Rail Act. Rail passenger groups sought to
enjoin discontinuation of service. Although an amendment on point
had been proposed in Congress, 10 the final bill did not provide for
private suit. Instead, enforcement was entrusted to the Attorney
General and to railroad employees.'" The Supreme Court concluded
that the express remedies are "the exclusive means to enforce the
duties and obligations imposed by the [Rail] Act."2"' Furthermore,
the Supreme Court found that private suits would frustrate the
206. 571 F.2d at 801.
207. Id. at 816 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
208. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
209. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
210. See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 162 at 179 (citing Supplemental Hearings on
H. R. 17849 & S. 3706, Before the Subcomm. on Transp. & Aero. of the House Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1970)).
211. 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1970).
212. 414 U.S. at 458.
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purpose of the Rail Act and that the agency action was a sufficient
213
remedy.
Similarly, in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour
(the SIPC case), 14 the Supreme Court found that the congressional
purpose was better served by agency proceedings than by judicial
remedy. The SIPC case involved the right of a receiver for an insolvent brokerage house to sue to compel the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private membership corporation created by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), 13 to
intervene in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceedings and to provide relief to customers of the brokerage house.2 1, The
Supreme Court cited the Amtrak case as authority for its reliance
on agency proceedings as adequate protection for the public:
As with Amtrak, so with SIPC, Congress has created a corporate
entity to solve a public problem; it has provided for substantial supervision of its operations by an agency charged with protection of
the public interest-here the SEC-and for enforcement by that
agency in court of the obligations imposed by the corporation. 17
Therefore, a customer bringing a private action would potentially
interfere with implementation of the SIPA.1 5
Finally, Cort v. Ash"' involved an action brought by a stockholder of a corporation against the directors and the corporation for
alleged violations of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (the Act).112
Similar to its holdings in the Amtrak and the SIPC cases, the Supreme Court held that the Act provided an adequate remedy because Congress had established an appropriate agency to decide the
claim. 2 1 Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that a damage
award would not further the purpose of the Act which was to protect
the electoral process; protection of shareholders was merely inciden2
tal to the main purpose of the Act.1
213. Id. at 461-62.
214. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
215. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976).
216. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1976).
217. 421 U.S. at 420.
218. "A customer, by contrast, cannot be expected to consider, or have adequate information to consider, these public interests in timing his decision to apply to the courts." Id.
at 422.
219. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. 11, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496 (1976)).
221. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, tit.
II, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1279-87.
222. 422 U.S. at 79-80.
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These three cases share a common theme. In each case, the
congressional enactment had a broad public purpose that would be
frustrated by a private action or would not be advanced by the
private action. Furthermore, Congress had provided for protection
of that public right by a fully effective remedy, in each case, an
administrative agency. In as far as the party was protected by the
specific enactment, he could seek redress in an agency proceeding
rather than in the courts.
Davis is readily distinguishable. Constitutional rights are personal rights.23 It may be assumed that when one person's civil rights
are vindicated, society generally benefits. Nonetheless, the Bill of
Rights is intended to protect individual liberties. Thus, the fact that
competitive job seekers may have recourse to an administrative
tribunal does not protect Ms. Davis' constitutional right. She is,
therefore, unlike plaintiffs in the cited cases because their right, if
they had a right separate from the public right, was adequately
safeguarded in an agency proceeding. Restated, the emphasis in the
Amtrak, SIPC, and Cort cases was that effective remedy was already available. It is beyond argument that Ms. Davis had no remedy at all unless it was by way of a private cause of action. Recitation of section 717 of the Civil Rights Act,2 ' which provides competitive federal job seekers with a remedy, simply focuses on a problem
not before the court-whether section 717 provides the covered em25
ployees an adequate remedy1
The third Cort factor focuses on whether the implied cause of
action is consistent with the statutory scheme. In the Amtrak and
SIPC cases, the private action would have frustrated the public
right, while in Cort, the actual purpose of the Act would not have
been advanced because a private action would further only the incidental statutory purpose of protecting corporate funds. Ms. Davis
did not claim protection of a statute; thus, if applicable at all, the
Cort criterion should be rephrased to ask whether affording Ms.
Davis a damage remedy would further protection under the Constitution. If the choice is between no remedy at all or damages, the
conclusion is inescapable that damages are more consistent with
making due process guarantees effective than would be letting
Constitution-violators avoid all liability.
223.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

224.

42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) (Supp. II 1972).

225. Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976), upheld Title VII as the
exclusive remedy for those covered.
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The Fifth Circuit took a different tack: The fourth amendment
is to be enforced by those most likely to be hostile to it; Bivens'
violations take place in well-defined settings familiar to the courts;
and the fourth amendment has historically been a right difficult to
enforce. By contrast, due process may be violated in many settings
presumably by those not necessarily hostile to its limitations. In
some of those situations, damages may be an inappropriate remedy,
therefore, not necessarily consistent with enforcing due process
rights. Rather than exempting all due process violators, the court
might have examined to what extent a good faith defense would be
consistent with the implied cause of action.226 More importantly,
however, courts have considered closely analogous claims under section 1983 for years, and while there are limits on cases appropriate
for financial redress,"' federal courts have allowed damages for violations of due process. The federal courts implying a private action
under the fifth amendment would be faced with no greater difficulty
in determining cases appropriate for damages than that present
under section 1983.228
The court's discussion of the final Cort criterion suggests the
source of the court's hesitation to afford relief to Ms. Davis. Permitting Ms. Davis to recover damages "would project the penumbra of
federal court constitutional due process jurisdiction over every legally cognizable tortious injury inflicted by persons acting under
color of federal law . .

.

. [Such a holding] also would extend

federal jurisdiction to cover all state action tort claims, either under
pendent jurisdiction, . . . or under a cause of action implied from
2 29
the fourteenth amendment.

Davis did not involve implication of a remedy under the fourteenth amendment. However, Congress has already afforded an
effective remedy for those potential plaintiffs under section 1983.230
More importantly, the court's floodgate argument simply ignores
the Cort criterion it claims to be applying: that is, whether the cause
of action is appropriate for federal law or is it one traditionally
relegated to state law. The specter of myriad cases coming within
federal jurisdiction is chimerical indeed. Ms. Davis stated a cause
226. Cf. Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1047 (1978) (in which the Fifth Circuit read Bivens as applying narrowly to cases of
egregious police conduct and noted that a police officer's reliance on a warrant, even if
procured as a result of negligent police investigation, is justified).
227. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
228. See Carey v. Piphus, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978).
229. 571 F.2d at 799 (citations omitted).
230. See notes 208-22 supra, and accompanying text.
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of action not cognizable in state court, involving only federal interests, 3 ' and thus was sanctioned by the Cort analysis. The flood of
cases invoked by the Fifth Circuit-state tort actions- would be
improper for federal court action because those cases are traditionally relegated to state law. Finally, principles governing pendent
jurisdiction would limit the number of state cases from entering
federal courts in disregard of article III of the Constitution. United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs232 created a two-step analysis to determine
whether a state claim should be appended. The first step allows
federal jurisdiction if the state claim arises from the same nucleus
of common fact as does the federal claim. The second step creates
discretion to dismiss the state claim if that claim predominates.
Gibbs would require dismissal of cases in which an unimportant
federal claim is appended to create federal jurisdiction.
The second step of the Fifth Circuit's analysis was whether the
damage remedy was constitutionally compelled because to deny the
remedy would render the protection meaningless. The court believed that the right was protected because the aggrieved federal
employee could seek injunctive relief. In Bivens, the exclusionary
rule-a remedy for most fourth amendment violations-was an alternative remedy for other aggrieved individuals. As Justice Harlan
underscored, the exclusionary rule was irrelevant to people in
Bivens' position for whom it was damages or nothing. Similarly, an
injunction, like the exclusionary rule, might help other litigants, but
for Ms. Davis and Bivens, the only available remedy was damages.
If the court's view of Bivens is correct, its analysis still fails to
overcome another problem. It is submitted that the court's analysis
ignores the fundamental principle that equity acts only if the remedy at law is inadequate. 3 The Fifth Circuit conceded that a federal
employee states a cause of action under the Constitution for discrimination.3 In this author's view, the next question should be
whether a court has authority to order the employee reinstated if
damages would compensate the victim. Indeed, "[h]istorically,
231. The court en banc recognized that no state cause of action was involved in Davis:
"[The particular circumstances of the case at bar raise questions of federal rights in federal
employment .... " 571 F.2d at 799:
232. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
233. "The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences

in employing the extraordinary remedy of the injunction." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
234. "Denying an implied cause of action for money damages does not render meaningless any constitutional rights of congressional employees. A plaintiff might still seek equitable
relief where the employer remained in office . . . ." 571 F.2d at 800.
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damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion
' 35
of personal interests in liberty.
Davis raises more questions than it answers. The opinion is
result-oriented. The court distinguishes Bivens, closely analogous
precedent, on uncompelling grounds. The decision's reliance on
Cort is both misplaced and erroneous. The court invokes the deluge
of cases flooding the already sinking federal judiciary. The feared
deluge is credible only if explicit language in Cort is ignored. It is
true that the Burger Court has announced a preference for state
judicial remedies or administrative proceedings if available;2 31 but
the Supreme Court has neither overruled Bivens nor abrogated the
doctrine allowing implication of a private cause of action. Given the
tortuous route taken by the Fifth Circuit, one can lament that Davis
is a fine thing indeed, leaving the plaintiff with an acknowledged
right but no remedy! Finally, after avoiding the issue in previous
litigation, the Supreme Court would do well to decide the extent to
which a federal court may imply a cause of action for money damages under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Judgment Finality
One final case, Fackelman v. Bell,2 37 is included for two purposes: (1) it illustrates the analysis necessary to determine the propriety of a district court's decision to set judgment under rule
60(b);23 and (2) it contains a lesson in humility for the practitioner.
While incarcerated in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, Fackelman, the appellant, sought access to his prison files under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).2' Officials complied in part, but
withheld documents considered exempt from disclosure under the
FOIA. After exhausting administrative appeal, appellant filed suit
pro se, styled as a habeas corpus action.
The district court requested a response from prison officials.
Meanwhile, appellant was transferred to the federal penitentiary at
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. The officials' response and certificate of
service were made on December 11, 1975. Presumably, because of
the transfer, appellant did not receive the response until January 22,
235. 403 U.S. at 395.
236. See Walker, Restitutionary Relief in the Absence of Standing to Challenge Violations of Rule 10b-5 and Section 14(e), 23 Loy. L. REv. 893-97 (1977).
237. 564 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1977).

238. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
239.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
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1976. Before appellant could reply, the court denied his habeas petition and entered judgment for the prison officials. Appellant filed a
notice of appeal. At that point, appellant retained counsel who
withdrew notice of appeal and instead, pursued relief under rule
60(b) to set aside the January 28 judgment. The court denied the
rule 60(b) motion and subsequently denied a rehearing on that motion. Appeal was taken from the denial of Fackelman's motion for
rehearing.
Had counsel pursued the appeal as filed, the Fifth Circuit
would have reached appellant's challenge to the prison officials'
claim that specific documents were exempt from disclosure under
the FOIA. Instead, the question before the court was whether the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the rule 60(b)
motion 240
Initially, the court explored the use and effect of a rule 60(b)
motion which the court found permits a judgment to be set aside
and "is to be 'construed liberally to do substantial justice,' . . .
[but] . . .is not a substitute for appeal." 24 ' Its use is most important when the "true merits" of a case have not been considered by
the court,"4 and reconsideration would obviate the need for appeal.
The negative aspects of granting a rule 60(b) motion are that it
contravenes the desirability of judgment finality, and orderliness
and predictability of the judicial process, especially, but not only,
if opening the judgment could unfairly prejudice the opposing party.
Appellant raised three contentions under rule 60(b), but only
the third contention merits serious discussion. That contention was
that the court should have reopened the judgment based on rule
60(b)(6). This section states that "the court may relieve a party...
from a final judgment . . . [for] any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of [that] judgment." ' The court considered the
argument very briefly; "[a] 60(b)(6) motion is an extraordinary
remedy; . . .it is not a substitute for appeal, and it is ordinarily
not available to one who fails to appeal. . . .In this case we do not
find the extraordinary circumstances that might require a reversal
...
"I The court noted twice that
of the trial court under 60(b)(6).
240. Rule 60(b) is used most commonly when judgment is taken by default. See
WRIGHr, supra note 101, § 98 at 489-91.
241. 564 F.2d at 735 (quoting Laguna Royalty Co. v. Marsh, 350 F.2d 817, 823 (5th Cir.
1965)).
242. Id. at 735.
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
244. 564 F.2d at 737 (citations omitted).
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the issues raised by the rule 60(b) motion were questions of law,
properly raised on appeal. The court was at a loss to explain petitioner's failure to prosecute his appeal and stated that "a 60(b)
motion is not a remedy for one who fails to prosecute his rights. 24 5
Since appellant did file an appeal but was thwarted in his attempt
to prosecute it by counsel who substituted a rule 60(b) motion for
the appeal, it is submitted that the court could have answered its
own query.
As noted by Professor Wright, "[t]he court has considerable
discretion in motions for relief from judgments, and the teaching of
experience is that the courts will not permit technicalities to prevent
them from remedying injustice.

2

Wright also states that courts

must balance interests of judgment finality and prejudice to the
opposing party. At least one commentator has argued that begrudg24 7
ing application of the rule violates its purpose.

In Fackelman, the interest of judgment finality was not great.
The rule 60(b) motion was filed promptly, presenting no greater
impediment to finality than would an appeal. Furthermore, there
was no prejudice to the prison officials. They were placed on notice
immediately that appellant was seeking an appropriate forum for
review of the district court's conclusion of law. They would not have
discarded any evidence, nor would the claim have become stale. It
is submitted that the motion should have been granted because the
district court's original disposition of the habeas petition was premature, in that appellant did not have the opportunity to answer
the prison officials' response to the habeas petition. Finally, two
"extraordinary circumstances" were present. First, appellant's failure to make a prompt reply to appellees' response was obviously due
to his transfer to the Lewisburg prison. Appellant was not abusing
the system by avoiding orderly procedures. Second, his right to have
his appeal considered on its merits was foreclosed by counsel who
withdrew the notice of appeal. The district court was confronted
with a factually unique situaton in which a litigant would lose his
appellate rights because of two intervening factors beyond his control, and where the opposing party would suffer no undue prejudice
if relief was afforded. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's assertion, there
is an "appearance of serious unfairness124 in this case. Furthermore,
245. Id.
246. WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 98 at 490.
247. Wham, Federal District Court Rule 60(b): A Humane Rule Gone Wrong, 49
A.B.A.J. 566 (1963).
248. 564 F.2d at 737.
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had relief been granted, the case would not provide courts with
precedent that would permit the use of rule 60(b) to avoid the appeal process in the ordinary case.
Fackelman illustrates strict application of rule 60(b). In that
sense, despite the unique facts, the case is worthy of study. In addition, the irony that the prisoner followed the proper procedure to
obtain review of his claim but was frustrated in this effort by his
attorney should serve as a lesson in humility for practitioners.
Conclusion
During the period following World War II, and specifically
those years when the United States Supreme Court was dominated
by Chief Justice Warren, rapid expansion of federal court jurisdiction by means of judicial decisions occurred. In light of such expansion, judicial conservatives and strict constructionists argued that
the courts were usurping the province of Congress. 49 Since the early
1970's, case management has been a constant theme of Chief Justice
Burger.250 Legislation has already been enacted25" ' and is currently 52
before Congress to lessen the federal workload. At the same time,
the repeated threat of the deluge of cases has created a judicial
sensitivity to the impact of its decisions on that caseload. This
awareness is most clearly demonstrated in Davis, but is also present, although to a lesser degree, in Texas Acorn, Perry County
Board of Education,Fackelman, and MacDonald III. When the
courts attempt to limit their caseloads by judicial decision, the
result is haphazard and, as can be seen in cases like Davis, Texas
Acorn, and Fackelman, unjust. More importantly, case management is extraneous to the inherent judicial business of attempting
to provide litigants with a just determination of the merits of their
dispute. Judge Goldberg's dissent in Davis offered the following
compelling caution: "While constitutional interpretation may be
subject to ebb and flow, I have never understood the task of the
federal judiciary to be the damming-or damning-of rights that
spring from that notable document. Courts are not engineers, flood249. See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971). See also dissenting opinion of Justice Black. Id.
at 427.
250. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1972);
Burger, The State of the FederalJudiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
251. See H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1975) (abolishing diversity jurisdiction).
252. Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976) (repealed 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2282
(1970)) which had provided that permanent injunctions restraining enforcement of both state
and federal statutes on grounds of unconstitutionality would not be granted unless the applications had been heard by a three-judge district court.
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2 3 It is submitted
gating constitutional rights.""
that the same message applies generally to jurisdiction: Judges serve society best when
they do not erect barriers to the courthouse door.
253.

571 F.2d at 819.

